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Abstract 
A considerable part of theory in international relations concerns the issue of whether 
cooperation and stability can emerge from the competition and self-interest of sovereign 
powers existing in a state of anarchy. Does anarchy, if ever, imply stability in the form of a 
balance-of-power, or does stability require restraints which arise from the complex nexus of 
interdependencies characterizing the contemporary world economy and its associated 
institutions? The analysis in this essay supposes that nation-states are each endowed with 
some infinitely divisible resource, which those states maximize and which also measures their 
ability to overcome adversaries in the event of conflict. In this context we reexamine and 
reformulate the realist view, by offering a noncooperative, extensive-form model of 
international conflict without exogenous mechanisms for the enforcement of agreements in 
order to uncover the conditions under which a balance-of-power as construed by our model 
ensures the sovereignty of all states in anarchic systems. Our primary conclusion is simple: 
there exists at least one world, albeit abstract and reminiscent of the frictionless planes with 
which we introduce the perspectives of physics, in which a balance-of-power ensures 
sovereignty. 
CONFLICT AND STABILITY IN ANARCHIC INTERNATIONAL SYSTEMS* 
Emerson M. S. Niou 
Duke University 
and 
Peter C. Ordeshook 
California Institute of Technology 
Institutional restraints on action in anarchic systems arise, by definition, endogenously, 
and the establishment, maintenance, and evolution of those restraints must be understood in 
terms of the individual incentives of relevant decision-makers. Correspondingly, if we accept 
the premise that "International relations continue to be a recurring struggle for wealth and 
power among independent actors in a state of anarchy (Gilpin, 1981 :7)," then we can interpret 
a considerable part of contemporary theorizing about international relations as concerning the 
issue of whether cooperation and stability can emerge from the competition and self-interest 
of sovereign states. Can anarchy yield stability in the form of a balance-of-power, or does 
stability require restraints that arise from exogenously imposed institutions, from the complex 
nexus of interdependencies characterizing the contemporary world economy, or, in Riker's 
( 1 962) terms, from moral suasion? Burns ( 1968:249) states the realist position: "Classic 
balance-of-power theory can be interpreted as a hypothesis that in a more-than-two-Power 
world there are no non-autonomous causes of systemic change . . .  the purely political aspect of 
the system's power-political process always tends to produce a stable equilibrium that can be 
upset, if at all, only by autonomous changes." Such assertions, though, do not prove that 
nation-states can coalesce effectively to offset the ambitions of other states, that agreements 
can be maintained so as to ensure each nation's sovereignty, or that international institutions, 
as the byproducts of competition, merely facilitate the stability inherent in anarchy. If we 
equate the idea of regimes with balance, then Keohane ( 1984:99) states the problem succinctly: 
"The puzzle of compliance is why governments, seeking to promote their own interests, ever 
comply with the rules of international regimes when they view those rules as in conflict with 
.. . their 'myopic' self�interest." 
Despite the importance of such issues to international politics, they have a broader 
imperative, because they are fundamental to theories based on the rational choice paradigm 
and to game theory in particular. Von Neumann and Morgenstern's ( 1947) seminal work 
divided game theory into cooperative and noncooperative sub-parts. Nash ( 1 951) ,  however, 
suggested that cooperative action should be analyzed using noncooperative theory -- that 
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coalitions and the like should be viewed as noncooperative equilibria in which the
enforcement of agreements has as its basis the fact that no individual has a unilateral 
incentive to defect from an agreement. Until recently, game theorists largely ignored Nash's 
suggestion. A voiding modeling the mechanisms of enforcement, they developed instead a 
variety of "solution hypotheses" such as the V-set, the bargaining set, and the competitive
solution, which sought to identify the agreements that would be reached if enforcement were 
not an issue. Much of contemporary game theory, on the other hand, seeks to integrate the 
analysis of cooperative and noncooperative games along the lines suggested by Nash. The 
results to date are incomplete, but we now know, for example, how cooperation is sustained in 
the repeated Prisoners' Dilemma (Taylor, 1976, and Axelrod, 1984), how repetition and 
uncertainty sustain vote-trading in legislatures (Calvert, 1 989), and how, in some 
circumstances, to rationalize cooperative solution hypotheses as noncooperative equilibria 
(Selten 1 98 1 ,  Sutton 1 986). 
Rationalizing realism's argument about stability, though, poses special difficulties. 
Cooperation arises in the repeated Prisoners' Dilemma, for example, because the punishments 
that repetition allows provide a mechanism whereby all players can avoid mutually distasteful 
outcomes and Pareto efficient outcomes can be enforced and sustained as equilibria. In the 
essential components of the realist view, on the other hand, all outcomes are efficient since 
power, a relational concept, is in constant supply. Hence, cooperation can only be directed at 
implementing or blocking outcomes that are disadvantages for some and advantageous for 
others. So anarchic systems, reduced to their basic character, seem susceptible to those 
instabilities we associate with majority rule, and the question remains as to whether there is a 
theoretical basis for realist thinking - - whether we can sustain stability in n-country systems 
if the primary rule is that countries or alliances of countries with more "power" can defeat 
those with less. 
For special cases, of course, stability seems unexceptional, such as when one country is a 
hegemon or when there are only two equally powerful adversaries. However, we want to 
explore the possibility of stability in systems when there is no hegemon, when there are any 
number of countries, and when every country is the potential victim of some winning 
coalition. We proceed by building on a model in which nation-states, represented as unitary 
actors, are each endowed with some infinitely divisible and transferable resource that those 
states maximize and that also measures their ability to overcome adversaries in the event of 
conflict (Niou and Ordeshook, 1986, Niou, Ordeshook, and Rose, 1 989). To reformulate the 
realist view, we differentiate between two forms of stability: system-and resource-stability. 
System-stability implies that all countries can ensure their sovereignty -- that no country will 
have its resources reduced to zero. Resource-stability implies the prediction that no 
reallocation of resources will occur. We make this distinction because systems are rarely, if 
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ever, resource-stable and because the issue of sovereignty seems qualitatively different from 
the issue of how nations contend with the ebb and flow of economic and military capabilities: 
"disagreements about how benefits should be distributed permeate the relations among actors 
and persist because bargains are never permanently valid .. . Apparent victory can be illusory 
or defeat ephemeral, for political bargaining and maneuver result not in definitive choices 
conferring power on some people rather than others, but in agreements that may in the future 
be reversed or in discord that signals a continuation of bargaining and maneuver" 
(Keohane,1984: 18). In accordance with realism's fundamental concern, we want to focus on 
the conditions under which anarchic systems can be system-stable -- under which it is 
legitimate to assert that a balance-of-power, somehow construed, ensures the sovereignty of 
all states. 
To establish these conditions we build on a second feature of international politics -­
namely, that it does not correspond to a "single-play" game, but instead it is a process in 
which today's actions determine tomorrow's strategic possibilities. This fact necessitates 
modifying the assumption that nations maximize "power" in some myopic way. Specifically, if 
national leaders are concerned with a view of the future, and, .hence, with what their actions 
imply about the ultimate, overall distribution of resources, then this interpretation of 
rationality is not a basic assumption but, at best, it is a deduction from some model that posits 
more fundamental goals. If we assume instead that the ultimate goal is the survival of their 
nations as sovereign entities (Waltz 1979, 1988), then those leaders must evaluate a decision to 
attack another nation, to form an alliance, or to cede resources, not in terms of immediate 
benefits, but in terms of what an action implies ultimately about the likelihood that its 
survival will be endangered. Thus we echo Kaplan's ( 1 979:70) assertion that we must take 
account of the possibility that " . . .  the weakest player, by joining a nearly predominant strong 
player, only creates a condition in which he will be the next victim," as well as Wagner's 
( 1986:551)  more technically stated implication: "the basic question that concerns us is whether 
states will act so as to eliminate other states. If one state is eliminated from a four-actor 
game, for example, the result is to precipitate a three-actor subgame. If a value can be 
assigned to such a subgame for each player, it is possible to determine whether any players 
have an incentive to eliminate other players." 
Our previous analyses build on these observations, but they use cooperative solution theory 
to render predictions, and thus they circumvent the issue of enforcement and the precise logic 
whereby we can rationalize alliance formation. Here, we look more closely into the nature of 
collusive action in international systems, and, proceeding in much the same way as Wagner 
proposes, with a noncooperative model, we rationalize our previous conclusions about 
stability.1 System-stability can prevail even if enforcement is endogenous, and the conditions
under which this is true requires no special number of countries or distributions of resources. 
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In Section I we offer an extensive-form model of anarchic international systems. In Section 2 
we explore equilibrium strategies in that model for 3-country systems, and in Section 3 we 
explore 4-country systems. In Section 4 we provide the general results for n-country systems 
that support our central conclusion -- that a system is system-stable if every member of S is 
in at least one minimal winning coalition. In Section 5 we survey the circumstances under 
which countries that are not members of any minimal winning coalition are eliminated, and 
we also suggest when a set of countries might voluntarily relinquish their sovereignty in order 
to form a new sovereign state. In Section 6 we offer some substantive conclusions. Before 
proceeding, we emphasize that our analysis takes no account of geography, resource growth, 
war costs, uncertainty, and ambiguities in the notion of sovereignty. Because our analysis 
rationalizes much of the same conclusions about system-stability that we derive using 
cooperative game theory, our earlier treatments of such matters stand. Our aim, though, is 
not to formulate a model of international political processes per se; rather, it is to establish a 
possibility result that provides a theoretical basis for the intuition guiding the realist view of 
international systems. 
I. An Exten sive-Form Model of Conflict 
Beginning with some elementary notation, we denote a system by (S,r), where S = 
{ 1 ,2, . . .  ,n) represents the set of countries, and where r = (r1 , r2, .•. ,rn) corresponds to the
distribution of resources across S. For convenience, we suppose that the countries are ordered 
r1 > r2 > ... > rn > 0, and we let R be the total resources in the system.
2 Assuming that r 
determines winning and losing coalitions, we denote the sum of resources controlled by the 
members of the coalition C by r(C), so that C is winning (C is in the set W) if r(C) > R/2, it is 
losing if r(C) < R/2, and it is minimal winning if, for all i in C, C-{i) is losing. Thus, if r; > 
R/2, i is predominant -- it is winning against all other countries and it can incorporate their 
resources at will -- so every country has an incentive to avoid the possibility that some other 
country becomes predominant. Countries that control precisely R/2 resources are near­
predominant. 
V-/e next describe an extensive form game, r, that models conflict in which countries try to 
increase their resources by making and implementing threats against others and in which 
threatened countries try to maintain their sovereignty with counter offers or counter threats. 
Letting T be the set of all threats with respect to (r,S), then 
T = {(r',C) : r(C) > r(S-C), Cc S, where i E C  iff r' ; <!:. r;),
so r' ; < r; for all i E S-C. We identify threats specifically by C thus:
Tc = {(r',C) E T : r' ; <!:. r; iff i E C).
The game r, now, is described as follows: 
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{ I )  Nature randomly selects an i E S; 
(2) i offers a threat (r',C) E Tc, i E C; or i passes. If i passes, we return to step ( I ). If i
threatens and if r' i > r i' j is an active member of C, whereas r' i = r i for the passive
members of c.3 
(3) The members of C-{i} choose between approving or rejecting i's threat. If no member of
C-{i} rejects, then r' becomes the current threat; otherwise, we return to step ( I ). 
(4) With (r',C) the current threat, nature randomly orders the members of S-C, and we denote 
this order by 0 = (m,l, . . .  ,k). 
(5) With m in S-C offering the first counter, a counter takes one of two forms: a new threat, 
(r'',C") E TC'" m E C"; or a resource transfer from S-C to one or more members of C. We
denote those party to the transfer by C". 
(6) The members of C"-{m} choose between approving or rejecting m's counter. If a counter 
which is itself a threat is approved unanimously, it becomes the new current threat, and 
we return to step (4). Counter-threats that would be approved if proposed are viable. If 
one or more members of C"-(m} reject the counter, we select the next country in 0 and 
return to step (5). For counters that are resource-transfers, unanimous acceptance renders 
the transfer the new status quo distribution and we return to step ( ! ). 
(7) If the counter of the last country in 0 is rejected, the resource distribution of the current 
initial threat becomes the status quo, countries with no resources are eliminated, and we 
return to step (!) .  
This sequence of moves is, of course, a gross simplification of possibilities. For example, 
i's partners in C can merely accept or reject (r',C), but they cannot propose modifications, 
and, thus, r does not model the negotiations that might precede an actual conflict. 
Nevertheless, r does model a system in which "power" is the sole determinant of winning and 
losing, in which threats and counters are the mechanisms whereby countries secure resources 
and ensure their sovereignty, in which countries join coalitions because it is in their 
individual interest to do so, and in which no exogenous constraints or complex set of 
economic interdependencies ameliorate conflict. Thus, if system-stability prevails here, we 
say that a balance-of-power exists. 
Before proceeding, though, we must refine our assumptions about preferences. 
Specifically, if we think of resources as power and suppose that countries maximize power, 
we must nevertheless add an assumption about how countries evaluate elimination as an 
outcome distinct from the rest. Elimination, after all, is qualitatively different from merely 
possessing a small amount of resources. With a small resource base a country remains a 
potentially essential actor whereas with zero resources, it is forever eliminated from the game. 
We accommodate this fact by supposing that countries are risk averse with respect to the 
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possibility of elimination (equivalently, a country attributes a value of -ooto any outcome in 
which it is eliminated): 
If one act, a l ,  ensures that i cannot be eliminated, whereas another act, a2, leaves 
open the possibility that i's resources are set to zero, i prefers al to a2. 
The principle analytic feature of the game r, now, is that threats and counters can 
continue in sequence forever. However, there are terminal points. First, we initially interpret 
nodes in which a threat is implemented as terminal, although we do this with the 
understanding that such nodes are merely the starting point for a new round of conflict with a 
new status quo resource distribution. Any evaluation that the countries might place on such 
reallocations depends, then, on what follows in the new round. Owing to the following 
assumption, though, there is a second type of terminal point, which arises whenever one 
country secures R/2 resources: 
if r i = R/2, and if the threat (r',C) is implemented, i E C, then even if r' i = r i' i
can take advantage of the conflict to become predominant. 
Thus, systems with a near-predominant country are "frozen" -- no additional threats are 
worthwhile since the remaining countries will block any threat's implementation. Notice that 
we can rationalize this assumption by supposing that r i measures resource proportion and that
the conflict implicit in a threat's implementation destroys some part of the resources of the 
active antagonists. For example, if r = (50,33,17), if the threat (50,50,0) is implemented, and 
if the conflict destroys some of 2 and 3's resources, then 1 's relative share increases and it 
becomes near-predominant. 
Terminal nodes in which one country becomes near-predominant can be reached, of 
course, if an appropriate threat is implemented, but they can also be reached if some set of 
countries transfer some share of their resources to another country. We have not specified the 
circumstances under which transfers are proposed, but the incentives for accepting them also 
derives from the idea that conflict is costly. Without modeling war costs directly, we can 
make allowances for such costs with this assumption (for an analysis of war costs see Niou and 
Ordeshook 1989): 
If i can become near-predominant either by implementing a threat or by having 
some set of target countries transfer enough resources to i so as to render i near­
predominant, i prefers the transfer. 
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In confronting the threat (r',C), suppose the members of S-C find it in their interest to 
"freeze" the system. Letting max[C] be the largest member of C, if r(S-C) + rmax[CJ > R/2,
then S-C can freeze the system by offering max[C] enough resources to render it near­
predominant. Clearly, if S-C prefers freezing the system, it should transfer to max[C], since 
this choice minimizes the resources that S-C must surrender. And max[C] accepts the offer: 
Because attempts to secure more than R/2 will be blocked, securing R/2 by transfer is 
max[C]'s most preferred feasible outcome. 
When the members of S-C prefer such transfers is an issue we cannot yet address, but we 
must consider a second type of transfer - - by S-C to members of C-(max[C]) such that r"j 2' 
r' j for all j E C, where r"j is the proposed post-transfer resources of j .  For example, let r =
( 1 10,80,60,50) and let ( l ,2,3} threaten 4 with ( 150,85,65,0}. Barring a counter-threat, country 
4, in lieu of rendering 1 near-predominant with a transfer of 40 resource units, might try 
instead to disrupt matters by offering 2 and 3 each 10  units of resources, taking the chance 
that it will fare better in a game with the distribution (1 10,90,70,30). Whether 4 prefers such 
a proposal and whether 2 and 3 should reject this offer so as to eliminate 4 and freeze the 
system at (1 50,85,65,0) depends on expected value calculations, as well as attitudes towards 
risk. Notice, though, that if such a proposal is offered and accepted, it merely results in a 
new 4-country system, and if all such offers are accepted, we can cycle endlessly without 
eliminating countries, in which case (S,r) is system- but not resource-stable. However, we are 
not interested in resource-stability, and elimination, if it occurs at all, occurs only if countries 
are unwilling to propose or accept such non-terminal transfers. Throughout this essay, then, 
we suppose that such transfers will not be made or accepted, and we analyze the part of the 
extensive form in which transfers freeze systems or countries are eliminated.4
2. A Three-Country Example
Even after we eliminate non-terminal transfers, r remains a recursive game, because the 
sequence of threats and counters can proceed indefinitely, with each succeeding counter 
becoming a new threat that is itself subsequently countered.5 However, we can proceed in
the analysis by pretending that r is finite. First, notice that if a threat is approved, its 
characteristics and the status quo resource distribution are the sole relevant components of the 
situation. We suppose, then, that countries pursue the same strategy whenever they encounter 
the same threat (that is, strategies are stationary).6 Second, letting r r' denote the sub-game
that follows acceptance of the threat (r',C), suppose country i associates the value v ;Cr r, ) with
playing that sub-game. Letting v(rr,)  = (v1(r,,), . . .  ,vn(rr,)), this vector -- the continuation
value of r r' -- specifies what the countries believe follows from the approval of (r',C). Thus,
v ;<r r, ), when compared against whatever follows if (r',C) is rejected, determines i's
preference for acceptance or rejection of (r',C). Once values for all threats are specified we 
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can assume that the acceptance of a threat or counter is a terminal node with its continuation 
value as the "final outcome." We then analyze r as though it were a finite extensive-form 
game of complete information and we deduce sub-game perfect equilibrium strategies by 
working backwards from the terminal nodes in the same way we treat finite agendas in 
majority voting games -- we deduce what each country ought to do any time it must choose a 
threat, a counter, or accepting or rejecting a threat or counter. 
The problem here, of course, is that we have merely pretended to know continuation 
values. Nevertheless, we can define a stationary equilibrium as a set of continuation values -­
one for each threat (subgame) - - and a set of strategies for each country such that these 
values and strategies are consistent. Thus, in a stationary equilibrium, the choices that the 
continuation values imply -- the strategies that are a subgame perfect equilibrium given the 
continuation values, must, in turn, imply those continuation values. 
To illustrate these ideas, consider a three-country system with (S,r) = 
({l ,2,3},( 120,100,80)), and consider an initial threat by country 1 to eliminate country 2 and to 
share the system's 300 units of resources evenly with 3. Limiting our discussion for the 
moment to threats and counters of this type and to counters from one country to another that 
freeze the game, consider Figure I's representation of the situation (a * denotes a terminal 
node). After I proposes the threat, 3 must decide whether to accept or reject it. If 3 accepts, 
country 2 must then offer a counter that, given our limitations, is either a coalition with I to 
divide R,  a coalition with 3 to divide R, or a transfer to I (which, if offered, l is certain to 
accept since this is the best possible payoff for l given that 2 and 3 will never allow an 
outcome that gives l more). Notice that 2 need not consider a transfer to 3 since, being 
larger, country l entails transferring fewer resources. Depending, then, on which counter­
threat 2 chooses, either country l or country 3 must decide whether to accept or reject. In the 
event of a rejection, the threat is implemented and 2 is eliminated. In the event of an 
acceptance, the counter becomes the new current threat, and the subgame that follows is 
denoted by r with an appropriate subscript. Figure I portrays the next step in this process
with either l or 3 offering a counter. 
Consider, now, the following continuation values for the three threats that eliminate a 
country (we need not consider threats that give a country more than 1 50 since no country will 
assist in such a threat or allow it to go unchallenged): 
v(rc15o,o, 150>) = (1 50,70,80)
v(rco, 150, 150>) = (70, 1 50,80)
v(r<150,15o,o>l = v(rc150,o,15o>l/2 + v(rco,150,15o>l/2 = ( 1 10,1 10,80)
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where we suppose that 3 counters with ( 1 50,0, 1 50) and (0,150,150) with equal probability 
whenever it is indifferent between these two choices (or that 3 accepts each counter with 
equal probability if it is indifferent). With these values we can now deduce subgame-perfect 
equilibrium choices for the extensive form in Figure I .  For example, beginning at the top­
right of this figure, we see that 3 prefers (0,150,150) over r,150,o, 150> since the continuation
value to 3 of (1 50,0,1 50) is 80. We indicate this preference by an arrow. Similarly, 2 rejects 
r,150, 150,0> since vz<r,150, 150,oil corresponds to a lottery between 150 and 70. Thus, if 2
counters the initial threat of ( 150,0,1 50) with (0,150,150) and if 3 accepts, then 1 prefers to 
transfer resources to 2, because to choose otherwise leads to l's elimination. (We need not 
consider any other type of transfer: Transfers giving less than 1 50 are rejected since rejection 
implements the threat, and a transfer that renders 3 near-predominant is more costly than a 
transfer to 2.) Notice, now, that l's choice of a transfer implies that v(r co, 150, 150il =
(70,150,80), which corresponds to our initial supposition. Turning to the lower-right of 
Figure 1 ,  country 3 is indifferent between proposing (0, 150, 1 50) and ( 150,0, 1 50) in the event 
that 2 counters with ( 150, 1 50,0) and I accepts, so let 3 choose with equal probability. Once 
again, then, we deduce a value v(r,150•150,oil that is consistent with our assumption, so 1
rejects 2's counter of ( 1 50 , 150,0). Hence, since 3 rejects a counter of (0, 1 50,150) and since 1 
rejects a counter of ( 150, 150,0), 2's sole course of action when confronting the threat of 
( 1 50,0, 1 50) is to transfer resources to 1 so as to render 1 near-predominant. Thus, as initially 
conjectured, v(r,150,0, 150il = ( 150,70,80).
Figures 2 and 3 repeat this analysis for the remaining allowed threats, and they establish 
the consistency of the conjectured continuation values. Thus, what remains is the 
specification of v(r) and an equilibrium identifying the initial choices and responses of all
countries. Suppose first that v(r) = (120, 100,80) -- that both system- and resource-stability
prevail, which we presume arises because no country makes or accepts an initial threat. This 
supposition is sustainable, in fact, if we characterize equilibrium strategies thus: a country 
does not initiate or agree to a threat unless it gains resources. Since the continuation values 
for the game's threats imply that countries 1 and 2 can each gain from an initial threat, 
whereas 3 can neither gain nor lose, 3 has no positive incentive to participate in a threat. 
Further, since only 1 and 2's resources can be transferred, they are in a zero-sum game, and 
depending on the probability that 3 chooses one action or another when it is indifferent, 1 or 
2 has no incentive to threaten ( 150,1 50,0). But if 1 threatens 2 with, say, ( 1 50,70,80), 3 
rejects l 's proposal that it acquiesce to the attack on 2. Finally, neither 1 nor 2 has an 
incentive to threaten 3 alone, since 3 can counter with a threat that requires the originally 
threatening country to transfer resources to 3's partner in the counter. Hence, three-country 
systems can be both system-and resource-stable. 
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There is, however, another stationary equilibrium, characterized by "accept all initial 
threats if they promise no loss; otherwise reject" that sustains the continuation value v(r) = 
a(l50,70,80) + ( 1 -a)(70,150,80) = (70+80a,1 50-80a,80), where a is the probability that 3
coalesces with I if it is indifferent between coalescing with I and 2. Although country 3 
cannot gain resources if it abides by such a strategy (the continuation values for all threats 
remain as before), 3 has no positive incentive to defect unilaterally to another strategy.
Hence, there exists a stationary equilibrium in which 3-country systems are resource-unstable. 
However, regardless of which stationary equilibrium prevails, this 3-country system is 
system-stable. And since all 3-country systems without a predominant or near-predominant 
player are equivalent to our example, this fact establishes the possibility of stability in 
anarchic systems in the way that stability was envisioned by realist arguments. 
3 .  Fou r-Cou nt ry Examples 
Three-country systems differ from larger ones in that, if no country is predominant, all 
countries are essential -- all are members of a minimal winning coalition. For a system with 
an inessential country - - one that is not a member of a minimal winning coalition -- we must 
consider systems with four or more countries. To see that this distinction is important, let E 
be the set of essential countries and E0 the set of inessential ones. Suppose r= ( 100,95,75,30), 
in which case {4} = E0, and let the presumed equilibrium be characterized by "countries make 
or accept threats if they do not lose resources from doing so." Now suppose that 3 threatens 
( 100,95,105,0). If 3 cannot gain resources from I or 2, 4 must coalesce with I or 2 -- 3 will 
reject any offer, thereby implementing (100,95,105,0). But if I or 2 accepts 4's offer, each is 
vulnerable to counters by 3 in the form (1 50,0,150,0) or (0, 150, 150,0).7 Thus, I and 2 reject
4's overtures, and 4 succumbs to the initial threat and is eliminated.8 Thus, the system
({l,2,3,4},(100,95,75,30)) is not system-stable. 
On the other hand, if 4 is essential, as it is with the distribution r = ( 1 1 0,80,60,50), every 
country can buy stability and, as with three countries, no one is eliminated. However, let us 
pursue this example to illustrate the way which we analyze our model and the role of certain 
key assumptions. Limiting discussion once again to specific types of threats and counters, 
consider the following continuation values: 
v(rc15o, 150,0,oil = (a,b,60,50)
v(r c15o,o, 150,oil = (a,b,c,50)
v(rC150,o,o, 15oil = (a,b,60,d)
v(rc15o,s5,65,o>l = (150,80,60,1 0)
v(I'c150,85,0,65,l = (150,80,20,50)
v(rC15o,o,75,75,l = (1 50,40,60,50)
v(rco, 150,75,75,J = (40,150,60,50)
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where a < 1 50, b < 1 50, c < 60, and d < 50, and where the values of a, b ,  c, and d depend on 
the threat in question. 
We begin with the possibility that, in confronting any of these threats, instead of 
countering with a counter-threat from this list, a country in S-C proposes a resource transfer 
to max[C]. Notice that if two countries are simultaneously threatened, then if the first 
country to counter proposes a transfer to freeze the system, it cannot require that its partner 
in S-C bear the greatest burden. If it proposes such a transfer, its partner can reject and 
propose instead that the first country bear nearly all of the burden -- and at this stage that 
country has little choice but to comply since choosing otherwise implements the original 
threat. Further, if any other counter by the first country is rejected, the second can again 
propose, if it is in its interest to do so, that the first country bear the greatest burden. We can 
imagine more complex bargaining schemes among threatened countries, but the details of who 
transfers to whom has little bearing on our general conclusions, and our representation implies 
that whatever country responds first must bear the greatest burden in the event of a transfer 
by S-C to max[C]. 
Figure 4 shows the extensive form when (1 50,85,0,65) is the current threat. Country 3 has 
five alternative actions (in accordance with our previous discussion, we let r correspond to a 
stage in the game in which no non-terminal transfers are proposed or accepted). If it 
proposes ( 150,0,1 50,0) as a counter, then I rejects since, by assumption, v1(rc150 0 150 0,) =a
' ' ' 
< 150 and rejection implements a threat which gives 150 to I .  If 3 proposes ( 150,0,75,75), 
then country 4 rejects since v4(rc150,0,75,75,) = 50 < 65, and if 3 proposes (0,1 50,75,75), then
4 rejects for the same reason. And if 3 proposes ( 150,85,65,0), then 2 rejects since 
v2(fc150,85,65,0,l 
= 80 < 85. Hence, the only alternative available to 3 is to transfer resources
to I ,  in which case, as conjectured, v(rc150,85,65,0,) = (150,80,20,50). An equivalent analysis
holds for the threats corresponding to the distributions (1 50,85,65,0), (1 50,0,75,75), and 
(0,150,75,75). 
The situation is more complicated if two countries are threatened, as when ( 1 ,2} threatens 
{3,4) with { 1 50 , 150,0,0). Figure 5 shows the part of the extensive form that pertains after 
such a threat is accepted, and after nature selects 3 to offer the first counter (the situation is 
symmetric if 4 counters first). As before, 3 has four counter-threats, but their rejection, 
rather than leading to the implementation of the threat, gives 4 an opportunity to offer a 
counter. Since 4's options are independent of 3's choice, Figure 5 portrays only one instance 
of 4's decision. Working backwards on the extensive form so as to identify subgame-perfect 
equilibrium strategies, and looking at 4's decision, we see that if 4 offers (150,0,0,150), I is 
certain to reject since v1(rc150 0 0 150,) =a < 150. Similarly, if 4 offers ( 150,85,0,65), then 2
' ' ' 
rejects since virc150,85,0,65,J = 80 < 150. However, if 4 offers (150,0,75,75) or (0, 1 50,75,75),
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then { l ,3} and {2,3}, respectively, accept. Thus, there is no reason for 4 to consider a transfer 
to I ,  and, since it is indifferent between these two counters, we suppose that 4 chooses one or 
the other with equal probability. 
Looking now at 3's choice in Figure 5, because rejection of any of 3's counters yields a 
lottery between v(rci5o,o,r5,75,) = ( 150,40,60,50) and v(r<0,150,75,75,) = (40,1 50,60,50), if I
prefers v1(1 50,0,150,0) to a lottery between 1 50 and 40, 3 does not counter with
( 150,0,150,0) -- v3(r<15o,o, 150,0,) = c < r3 and, as we see shortly, 3 has better choices. If, on
the other hand, I prefers the lottery, then then the counter (1 50,0,150,0) is merely equivalent 
to the counter ( 1 50,85,65,0), since 2 rejects this counter in favor of the lottery. Finally, the 
counters ( 150,0,75,75) and (0,150,75,75) -- both of which yield 3 a payoff of 60 -- are 
accepted by { 1 ,4} and {2,4}, respectively. Now, though, we can introduce an assumption that 
does not affect our conclusions here, but which simplifies proofs later; namely, suppose i ES­
C, to counter (r',C), chooses (r",C'') such that S-C <;; C" whenever it is otherwise indifferent. 
Later, we state this assumption formally, but its rationale is that the threat against S-C makes 
the formation of S-C less costly (also, if i is indifferent, such a choice can characterize an 
equilibrium strategy since i has no positive incentive to choose differently). Presently, this 
assumption implies that 3 counters with (1 50,0,75,75) or (0,150,75,75). And, since an 
identical argument holds if 4 counters first, v(r<150, 150,0,0,) is a lottery between
( 150,40,60,50) and (40, 1 50,60,50) as originally asserted. 
Finally, let (1 50,0,1 50,0) be the initial threat (see Figure 6). If 2 makes the first counter, 
and if that counter is rejected, then 4 should counter with (1 50,85,0,65), which yields 
( 1 50,80,20,50). Thus, looking at each of 2's four possible counter threats, if 2's counters with 
( 1 50, 1 50,0,0), I rejects so as to secure (1 50,80,20,50). If 2 counters with (1 50,85,65,0), I is 
indifferent (3 accepts), but regardless of how I chooses, 2 gets 80. If 2 counters with 
(1 50,85,0,65), I is again indifferent and 2 gets 80. Finally, if 2 counters with (0,1 50,75,75), 4 
is indifferent (3 accepts), yielding 2 a lottery between 1 50 and 80. Thus, (0, 1 50,75,75) is 2's 
best response. And since nature can choose either 2 or 4, this argument establishes that 
v1(r<15o,o, 150,0)) < 1 50 and v3(r<15o,o, 150,0)) < 60. If nature selects 4 to make the first 
counter to ( 150,0,1 50,0), Figure 6 shows that if 4's counter is rejected, then 2 must counter 
with (1 50,85,0,65), because (1 50,85,65,0) and (0, 1 50, 75, 75) is rejected by 3 whereas 
( 1 50, 150,0,0) is rejected by I .  This fact implies that I rejects (1 50,0,0, 1 50), I is indifferent 
between accepting and rejecting (1 50,0,75,75) (3 accepts), countries 2 and 3 accept 
(0, 1 50, 75, 75), and I and 2 are indifferent between accepting and rejecting (1 50,85,0,65). 
Applying the same assumption as before, namely that 4 chooses a counter which includes S-C, 
4 is indifferent between countering with (0,150, 75, 75) and ( 1 50,85,0,65). However, as before, 
we see that v1(r<15o,o, 150,0)) < 1 50 and v3(rC1SO,O, 150,0,) < 60. A parallel analysis holds for
(1 50,0,0,1 50). 
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Having established that the posited continuation values are consistent with subgame 
perfect equilibrium strategies, we next identify a symmetric stationary equilibrium for the 
full game (by symmetric we mean that all countries abide by the same type of strategy). 
Consider the following two partial characterizations of equilibria: ( I )  no player makes or 
accepts an initial threat unless such action promises a gain; and (2) players make or accept 
initial threats if doing so promises no loss. For case ( I ), countries 1 and 2 prefer coalescing 
with 3 and 4, but, under the assumption of the presumed equilibrium, 3 and 4 do not accept 
any initial offer, because there does not exist an offer that yuields them a resource gain. 
Moreover, neither 3 nor 4 gains by a unilateral defection from its presumed equilibrium 
strategy. Hence, a situation in which no threats are made is an equilibrium; however, it 
cannot be a perfect equilibrium.9 If there is a chance that will 4 accept a threat in which it
does not lose, then 3 should not forego participating in threats that freeze the system. This 
argument bears on case (2). If everyone accepts threats in which they do not lose, then no one 
has an incentive to switch to a strategy of accepting or making threats only if it gains. Thus, 
given the limitations on threats we impose, our 4-country example is necessarily system­
stable, but only resource-instability corresponds to a perfect equilibrium. 
There are, of course, other possibilities that we must consider before we can uttering 
definitive conclusions. In addition to the threats and counters in this 4-country game that we 
do not allow, larger systems introduce new possibilities. For instance, if r = ( 1 1 0,80,60,30,20),
everyone is essential, but 4 and 5 cannot individually freeze the system. How, then, might 5 
respond to a threat of ( 1 15,85,65,35,0)? For another example, let r 
= (70,65,60,55,50). In this 
instance no country can buy stability, so might not countries 3, 4, and 5 look favorably upon a 
threat by 1 against 2, since implementation of the threat allows a subsequent defense by, if 
necessary, a resource transfer? And can country 3 respond effectively to a threat by, say, 4 
and 5?  We cannot answer such questions, though, using the methods we have applied to 
systems with three and four countries -- we simply do not have sheets of paper large enough 
on which to portray the situation's extensive form. 
4. A General Theorem about System-Stability
To formulate a general n-country analysis, we first partition S into two subsets, L and L0,
where each country in L, but no country in L0, can be the largest member of a minimal 
winning coalition. Thus, L0 is a losing coalition and consists of the smallest countries in S, 
but L0 plus any member of L is winning. For example, if r = ( 120,100,80), then L = ( 1 ,2) and
L0 = (3). More generally, except for uniform resource distributions, neither L nor L0 is
empty, and the significance of these sets stems from the fact that only the members of L will 
be recipients of a transfer to freeze a system and thus only the members of L can become 
near-predominant through a transfer -- in attempting to freeze a system with a transfer, 
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countries ought to buy as cheaply as possible, and it is never optimal to freeze the system with 
a transfer to a country other than the largest member of the threatening coalition. 
With this partition of S, our analysis proceeds thus: we define two types of continuation 
values, and, after isolating a particular set of threats, TP, we assign one type of value to 
members of TP and the other type to all other threats. These values and the definition of TP 
give TP "core-like" stability in this sense: no member of TP is an effective counter to any other 
member of TP, and threats not in TP are ineffective counters to the members of T. 
Consistency is secured by defining TP so that two or more of the threats in it are subgame 
perfect counters to any threat outside of it, in which case the continuation value of a threat 
not in TP equals a lottery over the continuation values of the threats in TP that are effective 
counters to it. For example, in 3-country systems ((1 50,0, 1 50), (0, 1 50,150)), when combined 
with the appropriate coalition structures and continuation values, illustrates T. The 
continuation value we assign to ( 150,150,0) determines that ( 150,0, 1 50) and (0, 1 50,150) are 
effective counters to it, thereby rendering that value consistent with our other assumptions 
and subgame perfection. We begin, then, with two types of continuation values: 
C l :  (r',C) satisfies continuation condition Cl  if v;<rr, ):::: r; for all i EC n L0, v ;(rr, ) < 
R/2 for all i EC n L, and v;(fr,):::: r; for i EC n L if r; < rmax[s-ci·
C2: (r',C) satisfies continuation condition C2 if v ;(r r' ) = R/2 for max[C], and v ;(I' r' ) = 
r i for all i EC - {max[ CJ).
We are especially interested, now, in a specific kind of threat, namely, 
Type 1 Threat: (r',C) is a Type I threat -- (r',C) E T1 -- if
i r max [CJ + r(S-C) ;;:,. R/2,
11 r'j = 0 for all j E S-C,
iii r' max [CJ = R/2,
iv � C" E \1/ such that C" n C = {k} = {max[C"]} � {max[C]}.
For any C there is an infinity of threats in Tc• including an infinity of Type I threats
(which differ only in the distribution of r(S-C) - [R/2 - rmax[CJ ] among C-{max[C]}). We
show shortly, however, that most such threats are strategically equivalent, in that they have 
the same continuation values, so, for the moment, if we can associate a Type I threat with C, 
we focus on one such threat and ignore the other threats that C might make. Formally, let C 
denote all coalitions that have Type I threats, let (r',C) be a particular Type I threat by C, 
and redefine the set of all threats T as T - ucEn:[Tc - {(r'C)}]. Later, we reintroduce the
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excluded threats to show that they leave our analysis unaffected, but now, with these threats 
removed from consideration, let T 0 be the power set of T1 , and let TP be any element of T 0 
that satisfies, 
i for no (r',C) and (r",C") E TP is C n C" = {max[C]) = {max[C"]};
ii il C E W such that 3 (r',C) E T1 such that (r',C) can be included in TP
without violating condition i (i.e., TP is maximal). 
We call a set TP that satisfies conditions i - ii a set of Primary Threats. Before we illustrate 
these definitions, we first state a preliminary lemma: 
Lemma 0: For each i E L, there is at least one (r',C) E TP such that i = max[C] (in
particular, {i} u L0, i EL, has a threat in TP); and for each j E L0, there is at least
one (r' ,C) E TP such that j E c.10
To illustrate, ( ( 150,0, 1 50),(0, 1 50,1 50)}, with the appropriate coalitions, is the unique set of 
primary threats in a 3-country system. In our 4-country example, both ((150,0,75,75), 
( 1 50,85,65,0), (I 50,85,0,65), (0,1 50, 75, 75)) and {(I 50,0, 1 50,0), ( 1 50,0,0, 1 50), ( 1 50,0, 75, 75), 
and (0,1 50,75,75)) are sets of Type I threats, but only the first is in T0, because ( 1 50,0, 1 50,0) 
and ( 150,0,0, 1 50) cannot coexist in any TP E T0•11 Finally, let r = (70,65,60,55,50), so from
condition i in the definition of T1 , threats in TP must originate with coalitions having three
members. Consider now the following distributions that, with appropriate coalitions, satisfy 
the definition of a Type I threat: 
I .  ( 1 50,0,75,75,0) 
5. (0,1 50,75,0,75)
2. (I 50,0, 75,0, 75)
6. (0, 1 50,0, 75, 75)
3. ( 150,0,0,75,75)
7. (0,0,1 50,75,75)
4. (0, 1 50, 75, 75,0)
There are three other threats that we might consider, namely ( 150,75,75,0,0) by {1 ,2,3}, 
( 150,75,0,75,0) by {! ,2,4}, and { ! 50,75,0,0,75) by { l ,2,5). However, each of these threats 
violates condition iv in the definition of T1 and, thus, they are not candidates for inclusion in
a set of primary threats. Indeed, the seven threats listed constitute the unique set satisfying 
the definition of TP. 
Our next lemma establishes why we are interested in isolating primary threats. 
Lemma 1: If all (r",C'') ff. TP satisfy C l ,  and if all threats in TP - ({r',C)} satisfy C2, 
then for any stationary equilibrium, (r',C) E TP satisfies C2. 12
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The difficulty with this lemma, of course, is that we have not yet established any result 
validating the assumption that CI holds for non-primary threats. In fact, the proof that C2, 
the consequences of Lemma I ,  and subgame-perfection are consistent requires an assumption 
bearing specifically on the nature of the stationary equilibrium that we can sustain. We begin 
with the observation that if a country is confronted with a threat it cannot counter so that its 
loss of sovereignty is inevitable, then it is indifferent among the various actions that it takes 
at that point. Thus, the actions countries choose in such circumstances are free parameters. It 
might seem, of course, that such free parameters are irrelevant to final conclusions, but it is 
important to understand that other countries may not be indifferent as to which action a 
country chooses when confronting elimination, and what they believe about the eventual 
choice of the threatened country can determine their prior actions. Indeed, these beliefs can 
even determine whether the country in question will confront the possibility of elimination. 
This discussion leads to the notion of a credible threat. Briefly, a threat is credible if: (I) 
it is part of a subgame perfect equilibrium, which is to say that at the time of its 
implementation, no other choice yields a greater payoff to the country in question; and (2) the 
belief by others that the threat will be chosen improves the utility of the country that might 
choose it. The assumption, then, about the actions of countries threatened with inevitable 
elimination that we use to characterize a stationary equilibrium is: 
CCl: If S-C has no counter to its threatened elimination, and if it cannot buy 
stability directly, then S-C transfers all of its resources to max[C]. 
This assumption is not without historical challenge. Although Nazi leaders at the final stages 
of World War II preferred capitulation to the U.S. and Britain as against Russia, the allied 
powers largely controlled the final allocation of the German resources. On the other hand, in 
addition to the imperatives of the Atomic bomb, Japan chose a timely surrender because of its 
desire to capitulate to the U.S. rather than contend fully with Russian territorial ambitions. 
As second assumption about equilibrium strategies, which we introduce in our discussion 
of 4-country systems, facilitates the proof of our central results. Suppose (r',C) is the current 
threat and let i E S-C offer a counter-threat. Any counter, of course, must either entail a 
transfer of resources or, since C is necessarily winning, it must coopt one or more members of 
C into a new coalition, C". Our assumption is that if i E S-C can form a counter that coopts 
only one member of C so that all of i's other coalition partners in the counter are in S-C, 
then, ceteris paribus, i chooses that counter. This is not to say that i will forego other 
alternatives if they are more valuable; but, whenever it is indifferent, i will take advantage of 
the fact that S-C is a coalition that, because of the threat by C, is "already nearly formed." 
Hence, 
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CC2: If (r' ,C) is the current threat, then, ceteris paribus, i E S-C chooses a 
counter, (r",C"), such that C" n C = {j), and C"-{j) \;;; S-C. 
We can now complete the specification of consistent continuation values: 
Lemma 2: If all elements of TP satisfy C2, if (r' ,C) f£ TP, and if all other threats 
satisfy C l ,  then CCI and CC2 characterize equilibrium strategies for r such that 
(r',C) satisfies CI . 13
Lemma 2 exhausts all possibilities not encompassed by Lemma I ,  so together they establish 
consistent continuation values for all subgames of r. 14
We can proceed now to our central result -- the characterization of the stationary 
equilibria of r. What remains at issue is a specification of a country's choice whenever it is 
selected to make the initial threat, and the responses of its partners in a proposed initial 
threat. Postponing the question of the fate of inessential countries, ssume that all S are 
essential. Limiting the discussion now to symmetric strategies -- strategies in which all 
countries in L, and all countries in L0 abide by the same strategy, consider this statement as a
potential characterization of equilibrium strategies: 
CC3: If i E L is chosen to make the initial threat, i randomly chooses (r' ,C) E TP, i 
= max[C]; and all j E C - {i} accept. If i E L0 is chosen to make the initial threat, i
randomly chooses (r' ,C) E TP, i E C; and all j E C - {i} accept. 
Lemmas 1 and 2 establish that if all other countries abide by the this characterization, and if i 
E L can make the initial threat, i's dominant choice entails selecting a threat (r' ,C) E TP such 
that i = max[C], because this choice renders i near-predominant and achieving near­
predominance is the best feasible outcome for any country. Moreover, both lemmas imply 
that no country in C n L0 has an incentive to defect from its strategy of acceptance (they can
never gain, and acceptance ensures that they cannot lose). Finally, suppose one of i's partners 
in C, say j ,  is in L. The question is whether j,  rather than abiding by CC3, has an incentive 
to unilaterally defect to a strategy whereby it rejects i's offer. Keeping in mind that j neither 
gains nor loses resources if it accepts, the benefit of defecting is that j might be selected 
subsequently to make an initial threat, or some country in L0, might be selected to make a
new initial threat and this threat might be one in which j is the largest member of the 
threatening coalition. On the other hand, the hazards of defecting are that j will otherwise be 
the target of any initial threat. Complex expected resource calculations, however, are 
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unnecessary. First, since we assume that all aspects of the game, including people's attitudes 
towards risk, are common knowledge, i knows beforehand whether or not j will accept its 
offer to participate in a threat. So if j would accept i's offer in accordance with CC3, either 
because j is sufficiently risk averse or because the probabilities of the various outcomes imply 
that j's gain from defection is negative, then the following result holds: 
Stability Theorem: If all i ES are essential, CCI - CC3, in conjunction with Cl  
and C2, describe a stationary equilibrium for r such that the system (S,r) is 
system-stable; but if r; < R/2 for all i ES, then (S,r) is resource-unstable.
On the other hand, if j E C n L is risk acceptant or if the gain from defecting is sufficiently
great, all countries, including i, know this fact beforehand and i will not propose an initial 
threat with j EC. Moreover, Lemma 0 establishes that for any i EL, there exists a threat in 
TP such that C contains only i and members of L0. Thus, if j would reject i's proposal, i can
find a threat that is accepted, so a slight revision of CC3 that precludes the selection of threats 
with risk-acceptant partners maintains the conclusion that system-stability prevails. 
With respect to the possibility that there is a stationary equilibrium characterized strategies 
by "no country makes or accepts threats unless doing so promises an immediate gain," let r = 
(70,65,60,55,50). Since no threat in TP is accepted, let I threaten ( 120,65,60,55,0). Ignoring 
the incentives that countries 2, 3 ,  and 4 might have for avoiding a 4-country game, 5 is 
eliminated, because 2, 3, and 4 are unwilling to join in a counter in TP unless such action 
promises a gain to each of and because all threats here have three members in C. On the 
other hand, 5 cannot individually threaten anyone, whereas if it can make the initial threat 
and if there is some chance that others will accept a threat in TP, then 5's dominant strategy is 
to make a threat in TP in which max[C] = 2. Clearly, 2 has an incentive to accept, and 5's
other partners should accept as well since doing so ensures that they cannot lose resources -­
rejection merely allows a larger country in the next round to threaten them with elimination. 
Hence, the presumed strategy cannot be a perfect equilibrium.15
5. The Possibility of Instability
Because our stability result supposes that all countries are essential, we cannot preclude the 
survival of inessential countries. Of course, our analysis in Section 3 of 4-country systems 
illustrates the elimination of such a country, but 4-country systems are special and our model 
must be modified before we can eliminate inessential countries in general. To see why such 
systems are special, suppose r = (100,90,80,30), and suppose 3, making the initial counter, 
proposes (llO, I00,90,0). If 1 and 2 accept, 4 has no useful counter: Any counter in TP must 
include 3 ,  but 3 rejects such counters since it cannot gain resources with them and since 3 
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cannot lose resources in a 3-country system if (1 10,100,90,0) prevails. Alternatively, if 4 
proposes a counter with I and/or 2 against 3, this leaves I and 2 vulnerable to a counter in TP 
by 3 that requires one or the other to transfer resources; and since the game between them is 
zero-sum, one or the other will refuse to accept 4's proposal. With these consequences in 
mind, I and 2 accept 3's initial offer since, even if one or the other must transfer in the 3-
country game that follows, each must transfer less with 4 eliminated than otherwise. 
This reasoning, though, cannot be extended to a 5-country system such as r = 
( 100,70,60,55, 15). If 4 initially threatens, say, (105,75,63,57,0), then, in accordance with 
CCI ,  5 transfers to I and is eliminated. But now 4 confronts the possibility of having to 
transfer resources in the 4-country game that ensues. Thus, since 4 cannot gain by 
threatening 5, and since it can lose resources if it fails to freeze the system, it (as well as I, 2, 
and 3) strictly prefers an initial threat in T. What makes a 4-country system with an 
inessential country different from larger systems, then, is that the unique essential country in 
L0 cannot lose resources in the 3-country game that follows the elimination of the inessential 
player, whereas all countries can lose resources in larger systems. Thus, there is an irresistible 
incentive for countries in large systems, when initially selected by nature, to choose Type l 
threats that freeze the system. Countries in L will not forego the opportunity to become near­
predominant, whereas countries in L0 can be certain that they will not lose resources only if
someone is rendered near-predominant. As a consequence of this "rush to stability," countries 
in L and L0 sacrifice the possibility of wholly absorbing inessential countries.
To see, however, how a modification of our analysis leads to the elimination of small 
countries, suppose 4, in our 5-country example, can propose a "sequential" initial threat - - "3 
and 4 eliminate 5 and distribute its resources between themselves, then require that 2 transfer 
so as to render I near-predominant; but if 2 rejects the transfer, implement (150,0,75,75,0)." 
If this threat "works," then I ought to accept 4's offer, since by "working" we mean that I is 
rendered near-predominant. And although 3 might prefer a different share of 5's resources 
than the one 4 proposes, it should accept participation in the threat for the reasons we 
specified in the discussion of our Stability Theorem.16
What is at issue, then, is 2 and 5's responses to 4's sequential threat. Because we want to 
show that inessential countries can be eliminated, it is sufficient to find a circumstance under 
which elimination occurs. So, supposing that 2 is first to counter 4's threat, 2 must transfer 
since it has no viable counter in T. But if 2 tries to save resources by proposing a transfer in 
which some of 5's resources are ceded to I ,  I is indifferent between accepting or rejecting, 
whereas 5 can reject, secure the last move in the counter-threat sequence, and propose that 2 
alone render I near-predominant (at which point 2 accepts since rejecting implements 
(150,0,75,75,0)). Thus, 2 has nothing to gain by not acceding to the transfer, and we can 
assume that it accedes in equilibrium. 
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If we represent 2's choice by the decision to "pass," S must counter next. Like 2, S has no 
counter in TP, so it must consider transfers. A proposal by S to cede resources with 2 to I 
offers I no improvement over what it gets from 2 alone, so we can assume that, in 
equilibrium, I rejects S (and a preemptive transfer by S to I meets the same fate). Suppose, 
then, that S tries to disrupt matters with a preemptive transfer of something less than r 5 to 3
or 4. Since 3 and 4 are dividing S's resources in the current threat, both have some incentive 
to accept S's offer. However, if both 3 and 4 are risk averse with respect to the possibility of 
replaying the game with all n players (that is, neither is willing to accept the chance of being 
the target of a threat in the next round), S is eliminated. If one or both is risk acceptant, S 
survives but remains inessential with diminished resources (notice that S's preemptive 
transfer, unlike that of an essential country as embodied by CCI ,  does not remove the 
incentives of any member of C from proposing or accepting the initial threat). In the next 
round, though, there is a nonzero probability that some member of L0 makes the initial threat,
and that this threat once again includes S as its target. Now, however, 5 has fewer resources 
with which to tempt a risk acceptant country, and, eventually,. 5 is eliminated. 
One final consideration remains -- whether the revision of the form of initial threats 
allows the elimination of essential countries. Let r = (70,6S,60,SS,SO), and let 4 propose, as
before, to eliminate S and threaten 2 so as to secure an outcome such as ( I S0,10,7S,6S,O). 
Suppose 2 counters first in the same way -- acceding to the threat. But now S's resources are 
essential to 2's ability to freeze the system, and S, after 2, can propose a transfer to l in which 
2 shares most of the burden. Clearly, I accepts S's offer since it does not require 
implementation of a threat, and the final outcome -- 2 and S transfer to I - - is the same as 
when we allowed only simpler initial threats. 
However, not all essential countries survive sequential threats. Let r = (140,122,24,8,6)
and let { l ,3,4) threaten {2,S}. Country S's problem, now, is that S's resources are inessential to 
2's ability to render I near-predominant, so, as with inessential countries, a sequential threat 
eliminates 5. It is important to keep in mind, though, that the game r is not intended to 
model the entire process of international politics. Hence, we can imagine a "pre-game" in 
which countries 4 and S, anticipating their mutual vulnerability in r (just as the threat by 
{ l ,3,4) eliminates S, a threat by {1 ,3,S} eliminates 4), coalesce to form a confederation or a 
new country. The incentives to form such a confederation, of course, lie in the fact that, if r 
= ( 140, 1 22,24,14), no country is subsequently eliminated because all countries can individually
buy stability. Thus, reminiscent of Riker's ( 1964) analysis of federalism, we detect in our 
analysis forces promoting the formation of new states. Notice, moreover, that confederations 
cannot ensure the sovereignty of inessential countries: a confederation of such countries alone 
is inessential, and a confederation of an essential country with inessential countries cannot 
preclude the essential country's vulnerability to sequential threats. In this way, then, we can 
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reassert the conclusion of our previous analyses that only inessential countries are eliminated. 
Of course, this discussion is not substitute for a formal analysis of the formation of states, but 
we now see how our analysis can be modified to yield insights into processes that otherwise 
seem outside the realm of realist theory. 
6 .  Conclusions 
In drawing lessons about war and peace from our analysis, we must keep in mind that 
system-stability does not imply resource-stability. Resource stability requires equilibria in 
which no initial threats are made or accepted, so, barring the possibility of a corresponding 
equilibria for r (which we cannot do), only systems with a near-predominant country are 
necessarily resource-stable. And because we do not model the substantive form of a threat's 
implementation, we cannot be certain that system-stability implies the absence of wars or that 
resource-instability is somehow less dangerous than system-instability. Substantive 
conclusions must be treated tenuously, moreover, because our analysis fails to accommodate 
important features of international processes, including the uncertainty inherent in such 
processes, the strategic complexity that uncertainty allows, the contemporary disjuncture 
between military and economic capabilities, the possibility that national leaders pursue goals 
that do not translate readily into some notion of power maximization, and the ambiguities 
inherent in the notion of sovereignty. Our analysis also implies that, barring non-terminal 
transfer cycles, systems are quickly frozen with one country becoming near-predominant. 
However, this consequence merely underscores the fact that our model does not yet 
accommodate the unequal resource growth of countries that can render systems unstable (for 
an extension using cooperative theory see Niou and Ordeshook 1987, and Niou, Ordeshook, 
and Rose 1 989). 
Our stability theorem is nevertheless important. Whether labeled Ho Tzung in the Warring 
States Period of China, identified as the policy of a Great Power in the 19th century, or 
named Realism in this century, there is the continuing attraction and salience of the idea that 
some notion of "balance-of-power" is an essential source of stability. However, there has long 
existed one problem for adherents to this view -- the absence of any formal, deductive proof 
that there exists an interpretation of balance-of-power ensuring stability. Our 
conceptualization of r and our stability theorem offers such a proof. One can argue, of 
course, that our theorem is merely a possibility result and that its descriptive relevance is 
questionable; but with that theorem we can address secondary issues that arise in the context 
of realist thinking. For example, we see that stability does not require any specific number of 
countries or great powers, nor does stability require either a uniform or a highly asymmetric 
resource distribution. We have also seen that the allowable form of initial threats can alter our 
assertions about the stability, and, thus, our conclusions are sensitive to a variable that had not 
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previously been appreciated. Finally, looking at the threats and counters in TP, which are the 
primary instruments of resource reallocations, the target countries must be large enought that 
they can render max[C] near-predominant. Thus, although we do not predict initial threats 
that correspond identically to Riker's (1962) size-principle hypothesis, we anticipate alliances 
that correspond approximately to this hypothesis. 
Despite our emphasis on anarchic systems, our model also reveals the profound role of 
institutions as agents for facilitating stability. Common knowledge is an essential assumption 
in our analysis -- our conclusions follow only if all decision makers know r's structure (the 
resources of other countries, and the ultimate consequences of alternative choices), if they 
each know that all others know, if they know that all others know that all others know ... and 
so on. Moreover, if a set of primary threats is not unique, then system-stability implictly 
supposes that the set satisfying condition C2 is common knowledge. However, despite 
Blainey's ( 1 973) compelling arguments about the the consequences of violations of this 
assumption (a necessary and perhaps sufficient condition for war), we know little about the 
mechanisms that facilitate common knowledge. In vague terms, though, we know that 
strategic interaction and communication are "useful." We may not understand in any rigorous 
sense the way in which institutions facilitate common knowledge, but they are almost 
certainly essential towards that end. Minimally, our analysis identifies the variables and 
concepts that ought to be common knowledge if the stabilizing processes of balance-of-power 
are to operate, and, thus, we can identify the purposes that some institutions and processes 
might be designed to serve. 
Our model also highlights the role of attitudes towards risk, and the corresponding 
relevance of domestic politics. We assume throughout that countries (or those who lead them) 
are risk averse with respect to elimination. Nothing we have said about system-stability 
applies, however, if decision makers are risk acceptant -- indeed, risk acceptance almost 
certainly destabilizes systems. Thus, to the extent that attitudes towards risk are determined 
by domestic politics - - to the extent, for example, that decision makers equate their personal 
survival with their country's sovereignty so that the pursuit of dangerous foreign adventures is 
seen as essential to maintaining domestic power -- otherwise stable systems are destabilized. 
We sympathize, then, with those analyses that interpret Hitler's personality and the political 
economy of Weimar Germany as critical to the outbreak of World War II rather than some 
breakdown in traditional balance-of-power forces (c.f. Muller 1 989). 
A great many questions remain. Are there alternative classifications of threats and 
specifications of continuation values that yield different conclusions about stability? What 
outcomes can we sustain if strategies are more complicated (non-stationary), such as when 
decision makers punish coalition partners who defect from threats and counters? And since 
we have already seen the import of allowing sequential threats, how sensitive are our 
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conclusions to other changes in f's extensive form? For example, how is the game changed if 
we allow a threatening country's coalition partners to propose modifications to the original 
proposal before a threat becomes the current threat? Answers to these questions are topics for 
future research, and the questions themselves simply emphasize the fact that the preceding 
analysis is but a tentative first step! towards a thory of international processes. Nevertheless, 
we are now certain of one thing -- there exists at least one world, albeit abstract and 
reminiscent of the frictionless planes that introduce physics, in which a balance-of-power 
ensures the sovereignty of essential participants. 
23 
Footnotes 
1 .  Our analysis, although similar to Wagner's, differs from his in several 
ways. First, Wagner offers no general results about n-country systems and 
he proceeds instead on a case-by-case basis. However, we do not 
accomplish greater generality costlessly. Wagner pays greater attention to 
the mechanisms whereby nations war and secure resources from others, 
whereas we assume simply uncountered threats are implemented. Another 
difference is that we allow preemptive resource transfers. Wagner argues 
against such an assumption, but it is our contention that such transfers are 
not without historical precedent and are much a part of international 
processes (Niou, Ordeshook, and Rose, 1989). 
2. In addition to assuming that r strictly orders S, we assume that there are no
blocking coalitions, except when r i = R/2. Neither assumption is of any
consequence to our results, but their imposition greatly simplifies
argument.
3 .  Assuming that j E C  if r' j = r j precludes some silly possibilities; e.g., after
{ l ,2,3) threatens (4,5), {4,5) counters by threatening {3), or {4) counters by 
threatening {5). 
4. Several assumptions preclude "non-terminal transfers" without recourse to
complex expected value calculations. For example, countries are risk
averse in the extreme -- that i prefers ri to any lottery that promises both
gains and losses with respect to r ; ·  Or, owing to uncertainty about risk
attitudes, countries accept terminal transfers with certainty but non­
terminal transfers with probability less than I .  Since a non-terminal
transfer leaves open the possibility of elimination, risk attitudes with
respect to elimination precludes such transfers. Referring to an idea that
we introduce shortly, notice that both assumptions implicitly associate a
continuation value with non-terminal transfers that render them
unacceptable choices for S-C or C-{max[C]) when compared to a system­
freezing transfer.
5. This is not to say that r proceeds indefinitely. Indeed, barring non­
terminal transfers, our analysis implies that r ends quickly, after the first
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threat and counter. Nevertheless, we must accommodate the possibility of 
an infinite sequence of threats and counters. 
6. Assuming stationarity removes from the scene a great many possibilities,
including punishment strategies. For example, we do not consider that a
country, instead of choosing threats randomly whenever it is indifferent,
might limit its choices to those that punish specific countries because they
had previonsly defected from an earlier agreement. We know that allowing
non-stationary strategies expands the set of sustainable equilibria, and it is
certainly worthwhile to explore various types of non-stationary strategies
to learn more about the outcomes that can be supported as equilibria. At
this stage, though, stationary strategies pose a sufficiently complex analytic
hurdle, and since our purpose is to offer a possibility result about stability
in anarchic systems, we limit discussion to the simplest form of strategy.
For discussion of recursive games and the role of stationary strategies in a
different political context, see Baron and Ferejohn (forthcoming and 1989).
7 .  We can extend the previous analysis to show that ( 1 50,0,1 50,0) yields 
( 150,75-e,75 ,e) or (1 50,45+e,75,30-e), whereas (0 , 150,1 50,0) yields (75-
e,1 50,75,e) or (45+e, 1 50,75,30-e). For example, if 3 counters with 
( 1 50,0, 1 50,0), the final outcome depends on whether 2 or 4 has the last 
move in offering a counter, which necessitates a transfer. If 2 moves last, 
then it can propose ( 150,75-e,75,e), and 4 has little alternative but to 
accept, whereas if 4 moves last, it can propose ( 1 50,45+e,75,30-e). 
8. If 4 is threatened with elimination and cannot find a counter, it is 
indifferent among all moves, including a preemptive transfer to, say, I .
Later, we characterize equilibria with such an assumption, but here this
transfer is of no consequence: It eliminates 4, and, since 3 makes or accepts
threats if doing so yields no loss, 3 proceeds with the threat. In the
resulting 3-country system, ( 1 30,95,75), 3 cannot lose resources (also, 1 and
2 are better off with the elimination of 4 since, although one or the other
must eventually transfer resources, both must transfer less with 4's
elimination as a result of 3's initial threat).
9. An equilibrium is perfect if, for each i E S, no arbitrarily small probability
that others defect from their equilibrium strategies yields an incentive for i
to defect.
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I 0. First, with respect to T1 , C = {i} u L0 has a threat satisfying condition i
(otherwise, L0 E W and max[L0] E L), and it follows that conditions ii and
iii can be satisfied. With respect to condition iv, if C" n C = {j}, j i' 
max[C], then j E L0 and C" eE W. Thus, 3 (r',C) E T
1 . Second, with respect
to TP, it is sufficient to show that, regardless of the other threats in TP, C 
has a threat in TP. From condition i, C cannot have a threat in TP only if 
C" (; L has a threat in TP, but from condition iv in the definition of Type 1 
threats, C" does not have such a threat. Hence, from condition ii in the 
definition of TP, every TP must contain a threat by C in T1 . It follows that
every i E S  is in some C that has a threat in TP. Notice that, by this 
argument, every {i} u C* E W has a threat in TP, where i E L  and C* (; L0•
I I .  This example, however, shows that TP is not unique: {(150,0,1 50,0), 
(1 50,85,65,0), ( 150,0, 75, 75), (0,1 50, 75, 75)), and ((1 50,0,0, 1 50), 
( 150,85,0,65), ( 150,0,75,75), (0,150,75 ,75)} are also sets in T0• But notice 
that these sets are asymmetric in that each renders some i E L0 invulnerable 
to threats in TP. Only ((150,85,65,0), (1 50,85,0,65), ( 1 50,0,75,75), 
(0,150,75,75)} treats 4 and 5 symmetrically, and so if there is the common 
knowledge presumption of "equal treatment" by all members of S, then this 
set is the "primary" primary set of r. 
12. Let (r',C) E TP and let nature order S-C as 0. We want to show that S-C
must transfer to max[C]. Let j E S-C be last in the order 0, and consider
the counter (r",C"), j E C". Clearly, C n C" i' 0, and so we have three cases.
First, if i E L0 n C n C", then i rejects (r",C") since r' ; > r; and, from the
assumption that (r",C") satisfies Cl or C2, v;(rr,,) � r; . Second, suppose
that max[CJ E C  n C". If max[C"] = max[C], then, since (r',C) E TP, (r'',C")
(£ TP, in which case, from C l ,  r'max[CJ (= R/2) > v;(rr,,) (< R/2), and
max[C] rejects (r",C"). Similarly, if max[C"] i' max[CJ, then max[CJ again
rejects (r",C"). Finally, let L' = {i E L  : r' ; < R/2}, and C n C" = L'. So, if
(r",C'') E TP, then, from C2, r' ; > v;(rr,,) for all i E L', and each such i
rejects (r'',C"). If (r",C'') (£ TP, it satisfies C l .  Letting i* = min[L'], since C
n C" = L', it must be the case that r i* < rmax[s·cuJ , so from C I ,  v i*(r ru) < 
r i*• and i* rejects (r",C"). Hence, the last country in 0 must propose a
transfer, and this reasoning can be applied to the next-to-last country in 0,
and so forth. Thus, the only counter to (r',C) is a transfer to max[C] by S­
C, which establishes C2 with respect to (r',C).
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1 3 .  Let nature order S-C as 0. We have three cases: First, r(S-C) + rmax [CJ � 
R/2. Let K = {(r'',C")ET : C" E W, C"nC = {k}, k = max[C"] i max[C] = {i}}.
Clearly, K i 0. It is sufficient to show that 3 (r",C"), (r+, C.J E TP n K
such that C" n S-C i 0 and C+ n S-C i 0 and max[C"] i max[C+l· To 
establish that at least one (r",C") E K  is in TP, we show first that K !: T1 ,
which requires that, for any (r",C'') E K, 13 (r0,C0) such that C0 E W, C0 n
C" = {j} and j = max[C0] i max[C"] = k. Suppose (r0,C0) exist, and let C0 = 
{h E S-C" : rh < rj} u {j}, where j E C". By assumption, C0 E W, so, since
r; > rk > ri ' {h E S-C" : rh < rj} u {i} E W. But i E S-C", which implies {h E
S-C" : rh < rj} u {i} !: S-C" ft W, so (r",C'') E T
1 . Let C" = S-C+{k} with k = 
max[C"]. Since (r",C'') E T1, (r",C") ft TP only if 3 C00 E W such that C00 n 
C" = {k}, max[C00] = k. However, since r; > rk and since C00 E W, then C00 
- (k} + (i} E W, but C00 - (k} + (i} !: S-C" ft W, so C00 ft W. Hence, (r",C'')
E T. Now substitute i for k in C" to obtain C+. To see that C+ has a threat 
(r.,C.) E TP, notice that (r.,C) E T1 , because the definition of T1 concerns
only those j E c. such that rj < r; . So (r.,C.J ft TP only if S-C++(i} has a
threat in TP. But S-C.+(i} = C, and C has no threat in T. So (r+,C.J E T.
Hence, 3 at least two counters in TP to (r',C), namely (r",C") and (r,,C+), 
with max[C"] i max[C.J, so v ;(r r ' ) < R/2 for all i E L. And since all
counters are in TP, v ;(r r , ) s. r; for all i E L0• To establish that v ;(r r, ) s. r;
for all i E L  n C for which r i < rmax[S-Cl ' we must show that no counter in
TP by any j E S-C has such an i as its maximal member. Using CC2, let G 
!: S-C and C" = G u  {i} with max[C"] = i. If C" E W, then C"-(i}+(max[S­
C]} E W, but C"-(i}+(max[S-C]} !: S-C ft W, which is a contradiction. 
Second, r(S-C) + rmax[CJ � R/2 and (r',C) E' T1 but (r',C) ft TP. Hence, 3
(r",C") E TP such that C" = S-C + {max[C]}, S-C" = C - (max[C]}. If nature 
orders S-C as 0, then if all counters up to the last player in 0 are rejected, 
this last player in 0 proposes (r'',C"), which, from C2, is accepted by 
max(C) and all other members of C". Therefore, if the next-to-the-last 
player in 0 proposes a threat by {i}+L0, i E L, by Lemma 0 this threat is in
TP, so it is accepted. This argument can be repeated to establish that the 
first player in 0 can propose a threat in TP which has a positive probability 
of being accepted, and, thus, condition Cl  is established. Third, r(S-C) + 
rmax[CJ < R/2. Hence, the last country in 0 has no counter in TP that is
accepted: Any counter in TP which includes i E 0 must include two or 
more members of C since S-C + (j} ft W, j E C, and, because C2 implies 
that all threats in TP yield a gain to only one country, at least one member 
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of a countering coalition will prefer (r',C). If i E 0 can offer a counter not 
in TP, then by the assumption of the lemma, v(r r'l satisfies C l .  If no
counter is available to i E 0, then S-C is eliminated and i E S-C is 
indifferent as to the final allocation of its resources. So let i propose a 
transfer of the resources of S-C in accordance with CCI .  This argument 
applies also to the next-to-the-last country in 0, etc. so, in accordance 
with CCI ,  the first country in 0 might as well propose the transfer the last 
country in 0 would propose or a counter that satisfies Cl  if such a counter 
exists that is accepted, in which case vmax[CJ (rr, ) < R/2 and v;(rr, )  = r1 for
all i E C-max[C]. 
14. We can now reintroduce those previously excluded threats by showing that
they are strategically equivalent to threats already considered, where (r',C)
and (r",C) are equivalent if v(r r'l = v(r r"). Recalling that C denotes the
coalitions with a threat in T1 , let T' c be all the Type I threats by C (threats
that differ only by the distribution within C-{max[CJ} of r(S-C)-[R/2-
rmax[CJ ]. From the proof of Lemma l ,  all such threats are strategically
equivalent (since the proof of that lemma requires only that r' 1 � r 1 for all i
E C-{max[C])). Thus, r's strategic structure is unaffected if we select one
element of T' c as representative of the set, and "discard" the rest. There
remains the threats in T"c = Tc - T' c• such as, with 4-countries
((1 30,0,90,80),(1 ,3,4)). In this example, the only coalition with a threat
that might be viable against ((130,0,90,80),{l ,3,4)) is { 1 ,2), such as
(( 1 50, 150,0,0),(1 ,2)), because Cl does not exclude the possibility that
v1(r,150, 150,o,o>l > 1 30. If this is true, then v(r,130,0,90,80>) = 
v(r (150, 150,0,0>). However, no simultaneity confounds the determination of
v(rC150, 150,0,0>), since this value is not a function of v(r,130,0,90,80>): if i E
S, whenever it is otherwise indifferent, chooses a counter in TP, then
v(r,130,0,90,80>) has no bearing on v(rci5o, 150,o,oil · More generally, for
any (r',C), C E C, no threat by another C" E C is viable against (r',C). If
no threat is viable against (r',C), then (r',C) is strategically equivalent to 
the threat in TP by C and, thus, we can "discard" (r',C). If :J (r",C"), C fl C,
that is viable against (r',C), then v(r r•) satisfies Cl.  In either event, (r',C)
satisfies CI or C2.
1 5 .  This argument does not establish the uniqueness of the equilibrium in our 
stability theorem. Even stationary equilibria are not unique since we can 
manipulate the probability that a country chooses one action as against 
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another whenever it is indifferent. More fundamentally, though, we 
should ask whether there are equilibria in which essential countries are 
eliminated. To this point we are unable to find such equilibria (assuming 
equilibrium refinements such as perfection), but we do not to prove that 
such an equilibrium does not exist. 
16. That 1 and 3's responses do not depend on the possibility that the 
reallocation of r5 alters f's strategic character among { l ,2,3,4) follows from 
two readily established facts. First, no reallocation of r j• j E E0, renders i
E E  inessential or k E E0 essential. Second, if i E E but r 1 + r; < R/2, no
reallocation of r(E0) renders { l ,i) E W. Hence, if i E E  cannot initially buy
stability, it cannot do so after an inessential country is eliminated.
29 
FIGURE 1 
r. I 150. o, 1!50 I 
150, 0, 150 
150, 0, 150 1 or 3  
'------ r 
0, 150, 150 
1 50, 150, 0 




150, 0, 150 
r;o, 1so. 1501 
0, 150, 150 1 I 150, 1so. o I 
150, 0, 150 * 
r;150, 150, 01 
150, 1 50, 0 
150, 0, 150 * 
70, 150, 80 * 
0, 150, 150 
150, 0, 150 ., 1
150, 100, 50 * 
r; 150, o, 150 I 
-._
o.:.., _1 5_0..:.,_15_0_ * 
I'i150. 150.01 
0, 150, 150 * 
�0. 150, 150) 
' 150, 150, 0 * 
I'i15o. o. 1501 
150, 1 50, 0 * 
FIGURE 2 
0, 150, 150 
r l150, 150, 01 \ 
150, 150, 0 (31 .. 150, 0, 150 ( 
150, 1 !50, 0 1 or 2
r 150, 1 00, 50 * 
0, 150, 150 
150, 150, 0 * 
150, 150, 0 * 
150,0, 150 
150, 150, 0 
70, 150, 80 * 
0, 150, 150 
150, 150, 0 
150, 70, 80 
* 
JC15o, o, 1501 
150,0, 150 * 
JC15o, 150, 01 
150, 0,  150 * 
Tio. 150, 1501 
150, 0, 150 * 
r:150, 150, 01 
150, 0, 150 
* 
FIGURE 3 
0, 150, 150 2 or 3 
150, 0, 150 
J�. 150, 1501 \ 
o, 150, 150 
�
 150, 150, o I 
'--- I' 70, 150, 80 * 
150, 0, 150 
0, 150, 150 * 
'i'1so. 150, 01 
150, 150, 0 
0, 150, 150 * 
0, 150, 150 
150, 150, 0 
150, 70, 80 * 
0, 150, 150 
150, o. 150 
1 50, 1 00, 50 * 
r; o, 150, 150 I 
150, 0, 150 * 
r;150, 150, 01 
150, 0,  150 * 
�o. 1so. 1so1
150, 150, 0 * 
�150, o, 150 I 
150, 150, 0 * 
FIGURE 4 150 0, 150 0 
150, 85, 0, 65 
150, BO, 20,SO * 
r.. { 150,0, 150, 0 )  
150 85 0 65 *
r { 150, 0, 75, 75) 
150, 85, 0, 65 * 
r:{ 0, 150, 75, 75) 
150, 85, 0, 65 * 
r { 150, 85, 65, 0) 
150, 85 0, 65 * 
r: ( 150, 150, 0, O)
150, 150, 0. 0 � 
. N 
150, 0, 150, 0 
1 50, 85, 65, 0 
150, 0, 75, 75 
0, 150, 75, 75 
r 
3, 4 transfer 
I'i15o, o. 150, 01 
I \ 1 \ \ I \ I 
\ \ \ I
\ I \ I
I I I II \ \\
150, 0, 0, 150 
150, 85, 0, 65 
150, 0, 75, 75 
0, 150, 75, 75 
3, 4 transfer "---'-
---'# \ 
\ \\ \ \ 
\\ \ \ 
\\ \ \ 
r \ \ \\ ( 1 50, 85, 65 , 0 )  \ \ \\
\ \ \\ 
r (.150, 0, 75, 75) 
r (0, 150, 75, 75) 
3,4 tranuer ,....----* 
I \ I \
I \ \ \
I I I \ 
I I II ! II I I I I \ / I I 
I I I
I I I 
/ I I I I 
I I 









�-r ( 150, 0, 0, 150)
150, 150, 0, 0 * 
--r ( 150, 85, 0, 65 )  
150, 1 50, 0, 0 * 
---r ( 150,0, 75, 75)
..._...:1::;50:::•....:1:::50::,, • .::,0.:.,:0:__ . * 
�-r (0, 150, 75,75) 
'-...:15:..:0.:..., 1:..:5�0 •:..:O.:..., O;__ * 
FIGURE 5 
150, 150, 0, 0 
150, 85, 65, 0 
150, 85, 0, 65 
0, 1 50,75, 75 
r ( 150, 0, 150, 0) 2, 4 transfer 
150, 0, 150 0)
 
150, 0, 0, 150 
150, 0, 75, 75 
0, 1 50, 75, 75 
150, 85, 0, 65 
2, 4 transfer 
r 1 150, 150, o, o I 
'-----' 4 \ I 
r: (1 150. 85, 65, O) I 
I 
r 
1 1 1 
1 150, 85, o, 65 11 I \  
\I 1 \\ I \ \ 
I \  
1 ,  
r 1 I 10, 150, 75, 75) I 1
2, 4 transfer *









I' I 1 150,o, 15, 75! / 
I 
{ 
r: I 1 1  10. 150. 15, 15> \ 1 I 
\ \ \ 
\ I \ 
I \ 
0, 150, 75, 75 
150, 0, 0, 150 
2, 4 transfer * 
1 50, 150, 0, 0 
I / 2, 4 transfer 
.--r: 
l 1 --'---=:.:.::....- * 
a 1 150,a5, o,ss1 1 1 12 • I I . '------&! '  




r 1 150, 85, 0, 65 )  
150, 0, 150, 0 * 
r I 150, o, 75, 751 
1 50, 0, 150, 0 
r 
* 
10, 150, 75, 75) 
1 50, 0, 150 0 ' *
r 1 150, o, o, 150 I 
150, 0, 150 0 . * 
/(,so, as, o, 65i
150, 0, 150 0 ' *
r I 150, 85, 65, o I 
1 50, 0, 150, 0 
r: * IO, 150, 75,75)
150, 0, 150, 0 * 
r: 1 150, 150, o, o I 
150, 0, 150, 0 *
FIGURE 6
References 
Axelrod, R. 1984. The Evolution of Cooperation. N.Y.: Basic Books. 
Baron, D. and J. Ferejohn. 1989. "The Power to Propose," in P. Ordeshook, ed., Models of 
Strategic Choice in Politics, Ann Arbor, Univ. of Michigan Press . 
---------�
. Forthcoming. "Bargaining in Legislatures," American Political 
Science Review. 
Blainey, G. 1 973. The Causes of War. N.Y.: The Free Press. 
Burns, A.L. ! 968. Of Powers and Their Politics. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall. 
Calvert, R. 1989. "Reciprocity Among Self-Interested Actors," in P. Ordeshook, ed., Models of 
Strategic Choice in Politics, Ann Arbor, Univ. of Michigan Press. 
Gilpin, R .  1 98 1 .  War and Change In World Politics, Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press. 
Kaplan, M. 1979. Towards Professionalism in International Theory: Macrosystem Analysis. 
N.Y.: The Free Press. 
Keohane, R.O. 1984. After Hegemony. Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press. 
Muller, J. 1989. Retreat from Doomsday, N.Y., Basic Books . 
Nash, J. 1951 .  "Noncooperative Games," Annals of Mathematics, 54:289-95. 
Niau, E.M.S. and P. Ordeshook. 1986. "A Theory of the Balance of Power in International 
Systems.'' Journal of Conflict Resolution. 30( 4): 685-7 1 5  . 
------------�
. 1987. "Preventive War and the Balance of Power," Journal of 
Conflict Resolution, 3 1(3): 387-419 . 
------------�
. 1989. "Stability in International Systems and the Costs of War" 
in P. Ordeshook, ed., Models of Strategic Choice in Politics, Ann Arbor, Univ. of 
Michigan Press. 
Niau, E.M.S., P. Ordeshook, and G. Rose. 1 989. The Balance of Power and Stability in 
International Systems, N.Y.: Cambridge Univ. Press. 
Riker, W.H. 1 962. Theory of Political Coalitions, New Haven: Yale Univ. Press 
_____ . 1 964. Federalism, Boston, Little Brown.
Selten, R. 198 1 .  "A Noncooperative Model of Characteristic-Function Bargaining," in V. Boehm 
and H. Nachthanp, eds., Essays in Game Theory and Economics in Honor of Oskar 
Morgenstern. Wissenschaftsverlag Bibliographisches Institut Mannheim, Wein-Zurich. 
Sutton, J. 1986. "Non-cooperative Bargaining Theory: An Introduction," Review of Economic 
Studies, 53:709-24. 
Taylor, M. 1976. Anarchy and Cooperation. New York: Wiley. 
Von Neumann, J. and 0. Morgenstern. 1947. The Theory of Games and Economic Behavior, 
Princeton, Princeton Univ. Press. 
Wagner. R.H. 1986. "The Theory of Games and the Balance of Power." World Politics, 38(4): 
546-76. 
3 0  
Waltz, K .  1979. Theory of International Politics, New York: Random House. 
____ . 1988. "The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory," The Journal of Interdisciplinary 
History, 1 8(4): 6 1 5-28.
31 
